Williams v The Government of St. Lucia
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | Lewis, C.J.,Gordon, J.A.,P. Cecil Lewis, J.A. |
| Judgment Date | 18 November 1967 |
| Neutral Citation | LC 1967 CA 6 |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1967 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Saint Lucia) |
| Date | 18 November 1967 |
Court of Appeal
Lewis, C.J.; Gordon, J.A.; Lewis, J.A.
Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1967
V. F. Floissac for the appellant.
J. D. B. Renwick (Attorney General), S. A. Browne (Legal Assistant) with him, for the respondent.
Interpretation - Declaration of Acquisition — Whether a statutory instrument having the force of law — Declaration held to be merely a way of recording an administrative decision reached by the Governor-in-Council and has no legislative effect — As long as Declaration specifies the particular public purpose for which the specified land is to be acquired it is conclusive as to that the land is required for that purpose and that the purpose is a public purpose.
I have had the opportunity of reading in advance the judgments which are about to be delivered by my brothers Gordon and Cecil Lewis. I agree with the conclusion they have reached and shall content myself with stating my reasons as concisely as possible.
Two main arguments were advanced by learned counsel for the appellant. The first was that the Declaration of Acquisition published in the Gazette was a statutory instrument having the force of law and to be construed according to well established principles of construction of statutes; and that although the Declaration recited the decision of the Administrator in Council to acquire the Ventine Estate it was invalid and ineffective to vest the property in the Crown because the decision was not again referred to in the paragraph of the Declaration which is introduced by the words “Now Therefore, It Is Hereby Declared ….”
In my opinion this argument fails because its premise, that the Declaration is a legislative act, is erroneous. In my judgment, the Declaration is merely the method prescribed by the Ordinance for recording an administrative (or ministerial) decision reached by the Governor in Council, with a view to the publication of that decision in the Gazette and at other prescribed places for the information of the public. It has no legislative effect and of itself does not either enact or alter law. The vesting in the Crown of the land to which it relates upon its second publication in the Gazette is not the result of the content of the Declaration or of its publication, per se, but is rather the result or the impact of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Ordinance (Cap. 109) upon the fact of compliance with subsections (1) and (2) of that section. A statutory transfer of title is effected, not by any enacting force inherent in the Declaration but as a result of the Ordinance itself and compliance with its provisions.
There is in my view nothing in the authorities cited to us inconsistent with the opinion I have formed as to the essential character of the Declaration. In neither of the cases, Mackay v. Attorney General for British Columbia [1922] 1 A.C. 457 and Musson v. Rodriquez [1953] A.C. 530, was it suggested that the record of the decision of the Governor which was held to be required as proof of that decision was considered to be a legislative act. Rather, it seems to me that these cases impliedly recognize that its true nature is that of an official administrative document. The publication of such a document, in compliance with a statutory requirement, whether in its original form or by incorporation in some other document in a different form, does not confer upon it or upon the latter document the character of a legislative act.
Once this is appreciated it becomes clear that the form of the Declaration is immaterial, as long as it sets forth the fact of the decision of the Administrator in Council and specifies the particulars prescribed by subsection (2) (a) to (d) of section 3 of the Ordinance. The recital that “it is considered by the Administrator in Council that the land mentioned and described in the Schedule hereto should be acquired for a public purpose, to wit, the development of tourism”, is as declaratory and as conclusive as to the facts therein stated, though introduced by the words “And Whereas” as if they were instead introduced by the words “It is Hereby Declared”. It is the substance of what is recorded in the Declaration, and not its form, which must be examined in order to ascertain whether it complies with the provisions of the section.
The validity of the Declaration was further challenged on the ground that it nowhere states that the Ventine Estate is “immediately required” for a specified public purpose. It was pointed out that the word “required” appears nowhere in the Declaration, and submitted that merely to state the decision that the land should be “acquired for a public purpose, to wit, the development of tourism is insufficient: for to acquire” and ‘to require” have different connotations. This submission was based upon section 3(2)(d) of the Ordinance, which says that the Declaration must specify “(d) the public purpose for which the land is required.” The cases of The Zamora [1916] 2 A.C. 77 and Vanterpool v. Crown Attorney (1961) 3 W.I.R. 351 were cited in support of this of this submission. In my opinion neither of these cases is conclusive of this proposition. The Zamora decided that the Crown has no power by Order in Council to prescribe or alter the law which Prize Courts have to administer, and that since by international law the Court had to be satisfied that property of a neutral seized by and in the custody of a belligerent Power was urgently required by that Power for use in connection with defence or the security of the realm before it could sanction its requisition, a rule of Court which required the Court to deliver up the property to the belligerent Power merely on a statement of its desire to acquire it was invalid and not binding on the Court.
This case is not an authority for holding that a Declaration of Acquisition made under a statute which prescribes its essential particulars and does not call for the use of the words “urgently” or “immediately required” is invalid.
In Vanterpool's case the question of the sufficiency of the content of the Declaration of Acquisition was not in issue. Cecil Lewis, J., sitting at first instance, expressed the opinion, obiter, that the Declaration should recite that the Governor in Council has considered that the land to be acquired is required for a public purpose. The actual decision however dealt with entirely different questions.
The determination of this question depends upon the construction of s. 3(1) and s. 3(2)(d). The latter subsection states that the declaration must specify “the public purpose for which the land is required”, not that the land is required for a public purpose. The wording is significant because s. 3(1) states that the Declaration that the Administrator in Council considers that any land should be acquired for a public purpose, when made in the manner provided by the section “shall be conclusive evidence that the land to which it relates is required for a public purpose”.
In my opinion, as long as the Declaration specifies the particular public purpose for which the Administrator in Council considers that the specified land should be acquired then the Declaration is conclusive as to two matters, viz: (1) that it is required for that purpose, and (2) that that purpose is a public purpose. Section 3(2)(d) must be read in conjunction with section 3(1) and means that it is not sufficient for the Declaration to state that the land is to be acquired for a public purpose but it must go on to specify the particular public purpose.
For the foregoing reasons I am satisfied that the Declaration in this case was valid and effective. In my opinion this appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.
I must add that the question whether the procedure adopted in this case for challenging the competence of the Board of Assessment to assess and award compensation was correct was not canvassed in this appeal, and appears to have been either waived or conceded before the Board. Accordingly, I express no opinion on this question.
A. M. LEWIS
CHIEF JUSTICE.
This is an appeal by the claimant/appellant against an award made by a Board of Assessment appointed by the Government of St. Lucia in respect of certain land situate in the Quarter of Soufriere in the island of St. Lucia, and which had been compulsorily acquired under and by virtue of the Land Acquisition Ordinance (Cap. 109) of the Laws of St. Lucia (hereinafter referred o in this judgment as the Ordinance).
Being dissatisfied, the appellant has appealed to this Court against the award which is in the following terms:
“(1) That the claimant be awarded the sum of sixty-one thousand and fifty dollars ($61,050.00) in full satisfaction of his claim against the respondent for compensation in respect of the compulsory acquisition of the Ventine Estate the value whereof is assessed as follows:–
(a) 40 acres of agricultural land
$24,000.00
(b) tourist potential of mineral springs etc
20,000.00
(c) 23 1/2 acres of non-agricultural land
7,050.00
(d) value of minerals
5,000.00
(e) unique character of fumeroles
5,000.00
61,050.00
(2) That the claimant having already received an interim payment of forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) the balance payable to the claimant under (1) above, be twenty-one thousand and fifty dollars ($21,050.00).
(3) That the claimant be awarded two-thirds of his costs, to be taxed.”
The land in question which is known as the Ventine Estate, comprises approximately 63 acres two roods and twenty-two perches, and it was compulsorily acquired by the Government of St. Lucia on the 28th December, 1963, in consequence of a Declaration published in the St. Lucia Gazette on the 21st and 28th December, 1963, in accordance with provisions prescribed by...
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