Spooner v Spooner
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | Hariprashad-Charles, J. |
| Judgment Date | 22 August 2002 |
| Neutral Citation | LC 2002 HC 27 |
| Date | 22 August 2002 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Lucia) |
| Docket Number | D 127 of 2000 |
High Court
Hariprashad-Charles, J.
D 127 of 2000
Mr. Christopher Anthony McNamara for the petitioner.
Mr. Alberton Richelieu for the respondent.
Family law - Divorce — Matrimonial property — Land pre-owned by husband but matrimonial home constructed during currency of the marriage and furniture etc. purchased with joint funds — Respondent husband occupying the matrimonial home for the previous five years — Petitioner suffering from a disability — Respondent husband not fully disclosing information required by court — Proper case for lump sum in light of financial needs and obligations of petitioner and her disability — Petitioner awarded one half share of the furniture, savings fund, rental value of the matrimonial home and value of the house and land which constituted the matrimonial property.
This application for Ancillary Relief came on for hearing on 16th day of May 2002 and on the following day, I gave an oral judgment and indicated that the reasons therefor would be reduced into a written judgment subsequently. I do so now.
The petitioner and the respondent are Saint Lucian Nationals resident in New York. They were married on 9th day of June 1988 at the Office of the City Clerk in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York. She was 33 and he was seven years her senior. There are no children of the marriage although the petitioner has mothered two adult children of another relationship and the respondent has at least eleven children from different associations. The parties lived and worked in New York during the first eight years of their marriage after which they decided to return permanently to their homeland. Mr. Spooner, the respondent arrived in Saint Lucia on 13th day of December 1995 and Mrs. Spooner followed some days later. He was also returning home to take up the position as Superintendent of Prisons in January 1996. As most wives would do, she came here, settled her husband in his new job and returned to New York on 14th day of February 1996 for knee surgery. She returned to Saint Lucia on crutches two weeks later. She then made a final visit to New York for follow-up check and in April 1996, she returned to Saint Lucia to settle permanently. But her dream quickly turned into a nightmare as she became a victim of physical and mental abuse at the hands of her husband; a former winner of Mr. America Body Building, a Juvenile Psychologist, a Doctor and a Superintendent of Prisons. And so, in or about December 1997, she was forced to return to the hustle and bustle of New York City to start life all over again, this time with a physical handicap — a severe knee injury.
On 7th day of November 2000, the petitioner petitioned the court for a dissolution of their marriage. On 28th day of December 2000, a decree nisi was pronounced in her favour. The said decree has since been made absolute.
On 20th day of September 2001, the petitioner commenced these proceedings for Ancillary Relief for a declaration that she be the owner of one-half share in the matrimonial property registered as Block 1054B Parcel 236 including the contents thereof and that the respondent be ordered to pay to her the monetary value thereof, or alternatively that an order be made for the sale of the said property out of which proceeds the petitioner be paid for her said one-half share. She also sought a one half-share of all funds derived from the said matrimonial property or owed as rent by the respondent, a one-half share of all funds standing in the joint account at Barclays Bank PLC, Castries and a one-half share of all funds removed from the “Right Time” Savings Fund. In addition, the petitioner sought Maintenance by way of periodical payments or a lump sum and Costs.
The petitioner's application for ancillary relief was supported by an affidavit filed on 20th day of September 2001 and a supplemental affidavit filed on 26th day of February 2002. On 26th day of November 2001, the respondent swore and caused to be filed an affidavit in response to the petitioner's first affidavit.
The matter was adjourned to Chambers on two occasions to facilitate an amicable resolution. When this reached a deadlock, pre-trial directions were given in an effort to expedite the matter and simplify the issues. It was agreed that all affidavit evidence will stand as evidence in chief and that the parties would avail themselves for cross-examination. Both parties were given adequate time to produce supplemental affidavits with accompanying relevant exhibits. The petitioner complied fully with the Order of the court. The respondent was unmindful. He was content to stand by his sole affidavit. He also failed to provide skeleton arguments by the stipulated date or at all.
At the hearing, both Mr. Richelieu and Mr. McNamara concentrated on the issue of the matrimonial property. The peripheral issues of maintenance and costs were not actively pursued.
The crux of the matter relates to the interest of the parties in respect of the matrimonial property (land and matrimonial home). According to the evidence, the respondent purchased the parcel of land on which the matrimonial home stands long before he met and married the petitioner. There is no evidence that the petitioner made any contribution to its acquisition. Consequently, the respondent owns the legal estate in the land and there is no evidence as to any beneficial interest residing in the petitioner.
It is however undisputed that the matrimonial home was constructed during the currency of the marriage. The respondent alleges that the matrimonial home was acquired with his personal savings and some monies from the “Right Time” Savings Fund and therefore, it is his separate property. The petitioner claims that the matrimonial home is community property and that she is entitled to one-half share of it. She further alleges that since she had made substantial contribution during the subsistence of the marriage, she is not only entitled to a one-half share of the matrimonial home but a one-half share of the entire matrimonial property (which includes the land on which the matrimonial house stands).
The petitioner alleged that their joint funds were used to purchase moveable household items including two cars, leather and other furniture, beds, stove, microwave, refrigerator and other household appliances totaling $150,000.00. She also alleged that as a result of the breakdown of the marriage and her relocation to New York, she has had to expend money to purchase new furniture and appliances while the respondent continues to enjoy the use of these items. In response, the respondent at paragraph 12 of his affidavit stated:
“The moveable household items are now over 7 years old and were bought with my personal funds with no monetary contribution from the petitioner. I further state that I could not finish paying for the said items and I therefore filed for bankruptcy in the United States for the sum of $85,000.00 as evidenced therein.”
The respondent has not denied the existence of these household furniture and appliances. He however denied that the furniture and appliances were acquired with their joint funds.
The “Right Time” Savings Fund of Philadelphia started in 1991 during the existence of the marriage. The petitioner was named as the principal beneficiary. The Fund as of 30th day of August 1996 stood at US$50,172.53.
At paragraph 12 of her affidavit of 20th day of September 2001, the petitioner alleged that the respondent and herself contributed to the “Right Time” Savings Fund. The respondent categorically denied this allegation and stated that he was the sole contributor to the fund. He however admitted that the petitioner is the primary beneficiary.
The respondent admitted that he rented the matrimonial home for a year at $2,000.00 monthly. He however alleged that the funds received as rent were used to build a retaining wall costing $50,000.00. The petitioner deposed that she was living in the house when the retaining wall was built.
Mr, Anthony McNamara for the petitioner forcefully argued that the matrimonial property and family assets should be deemed to be community property by virtue of the Civil Code of Saint Lucia. Learned counsel quoted extensively from the Saint Lucian case of Rene Cenac v. Earl Cenac (Civil Suit D.31 of 1984) (unreported) to substantiate his assertion. In that case, Bryon, J. [as he then was] dissected the law of Community of Property and proceeded to examine the concepts of “separate property” and “the property of the community.” At page 4 of his judgment, Byron, J. stated:
Article 1191 of the Civil Code of Saint Lucia states:
“Legal community may be established by the simple declaration which the parties make in the contract of their intention that it shall exist. It also takes place when no mention is made of it, when it is not expressly nor impliedly excluded, and also when there is no marriage contract. In all cases it is governed by the rules set forth in the following articles.”
In the instant case like in the Cenac's case (supra), the evidence did not disclose any specific agreement about whether there was legal community or not between the parties. Certainly there was no evidence of any agreement excluding legal community and there was no marriage contract. In these circumstances the provisions of Article 1191 require the finding that legal community was established between the parties. Byron, J. went on to explain (at pages 4–5);
“Article 1192(1) stipulates that the property of persons married in community is divided into separate property and the property of the community. The...
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