Newton Spence Appellant v The Queen Respondent [ECSC]
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | BYRON, C.J.,REDHEAD J.A,SAUNDERS, J.,Sir Dennis Byron,Chief Justice,Justice of Appeal |
| Judgment Date | 02 April 2001 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2001] ECSC J0402-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Saint Lucia) |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 20 OF 1998 |
| Date | 02 April 2001 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
The Hon. Sir Dennis Byron Chief Justice
The Hon. Mr. Albert Redhead Justice of Appeal
The Hon. Mr. Adrian Saunders Justice of Appeal (Ag.)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 20 OF 1998
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 14 OF 1997
Mr. J. Guthrie QC, Mr. K. Starmer and Ms. N. Sylvester for the Appellant Spence
Mr. E. Fitzgerald QC and Mr. M. Foster for the Appellant Hughes
Mr. A. Astaphan SC, Ms. L. Blenman, Solicitor General, St. Lucia, Mr. James Dingemans, Mr. P. Thompson, Senior Crown Counsel, St. Lucia, Mr. D. Browne, Solicitor General, St. Vincent & The Grenadines, Dr. H. Browne, DPP (Ag), St. Vincent & The Grenadines and Ms. S. Bollers, Assistant DPP, St. Vincent & The Grenadines for the Respondents
This is a consolidated appeal, which concerns two appellants convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Saint Vincent and Saint Lucia respectively who exhausted their appeals against conviction and raised constitutional arguments against the mandatory sentence of death before the Privy Council which had not previously been raised in the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal.
The Privy Council granted leave to both appellants to appeal against sentence and remitted the matter to the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal to consider and determine whether (a) the mandatory sentence of death imposed should be quashed (and if so what sentence (including the sentence of death) should be imposed), or (b) the mandatory sentence of death imposed ought to be affirmed.
The appellant Spence was the owner and driver of a bus in Saint Vincent. The deceased was a fare-paying passenger who exited the bus without paying. The appellant got out of the van with a gun and was subsequently seen to shoot the deceased who died the following day in the hospital. The Saint Lucian appellant Hughes was seen striking the deceased with a piece of post and a stone and jumping on the deceased after the deceased had asked him to "give me my thing". The deceased died from head injuries with extensive bleeding and a chest injury with contusion to the heart. Both appellants seek an opportunity to advance arguments in mitigation of the death penalty.
The issues which are raised in this appeal are based on provisions in the Constitutions of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia. I have decided to use the Constitution of Saint Lucia. The language and structure of the Constitution of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are almost identical and in my view the minor variations do not result in any differences in meaning. I think that the issues could fairly be dealt with under the four heads I list and the constitutional provisions on which they are based.
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[i] Whether the provisions of para 10 of schedule 2 of the Constitution prevents the appellant from challenging the mandatory death penalty imposed. It prescribes:
"Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of section 5 of the Constitution to the extent that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful in Saint Lucia immediately before 1 March 1967 (being the date on which Saint Lucia became an Associated State)".
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[ii] Whether the mandatory death penalty contravenes section 5 of the Constitution which states:
"no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment".
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[iii] Whether the mandatory death penalty contravenes section 1(a) and 2(1) which protect against the arbitrary deprivation of life.
Section 1:" Whereas every person in Saint Lucia is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place or origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely-
(a) life, liberty, security of the person, equality before the law and the protection of the law;
Section 2:A person shall not be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under any law of which he has been convicted."
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[iv] Whether the mandatory death penalty violates the Constitutional principle of the separation of powers.
It is important to state at this stage that the appellants conceded that the Savings Clause prohibits any challenge being made to the imposition of the death penalty by hanging because that was a description of punishment which was lawful before the constitution came into force. I think that is a fair and accurate statement of the position. This appeal did not contain any consideration of the question whether the imposition of Capital Punishment or the use of hanging as a method of execution contravened any provisions of the Constitution. The limited issue was whether the mandatory, or to use another word — the automatic, imposition of the sentence of death on a conviction for murder without consideration of mitigating factors offended the provisions of the Constitution.
We were treated to very interesting arguments on the principles of construction that should be applied and on the respective roles of the Court and Parliament in relation to sentencing policy. I think that I should make a few comments, at the outset. I accept and I am guided by the caution given by Counsel for the respondents. Rules of interpretation governing Constitutions are different from those governing commercial documents. Courts, while giving a generous interpretation, must carefully look at the language used so as to give effect to it and not resort to an application of distilled values which would result in divination and not interpretation. Matadeen v Pointu (1999) 1 AC 98 at 108 c-f.
However, it is our duty to give life and meaning to the high ideals and principles entrenched within the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution that are relevant to this case are part of the fundamental rights and freedoms which have sought to entrench and guarantee that citizens enjoy the rights and dignity associated with humanity. These rights fit into the universal pattern as evidenced by declarations and covenants to which nations around the world, including our own, have subscribed. The linkage between our Constitution and the international legal norms for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was expressed in the Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher (1979) 3 AER 21 at 25 in the well known words of Lord Wilberforce:
"Chapter 1 is headed `Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual'. It is known that this chapter, as similar portions of other constitutional instruments drafted in the post-colonial period, starting with the Constitution of Nigeria, and including the constitutions of most Caribbean territories, was greatly influenced by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. That convention was signed and ratified by the United Kingdom and applied to dependent territories including Bermuda. It was in turn influenced by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. These antecedents, and the form of Chapter 1 itself, call for a generous interpretation avoiding what has been called `the austerity of tabulated legalism', suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to. Section 11 of the Constitution forms part of Chapter 1".
The issue in this case, related as it is to the question of capital punishment, is part of a developing area of legal thought and jurisprudence on the value of human life. The legal norms that have been internationally accepted on this issue have undergone changes over the past half century. Any perusal of the relevant case law will demonstrate this. The differences between the older cases reflecting values that were harsher, more oppressive and discriminatory and the modern, which give effect to evolving standard of decency demonstrate a favourable modification of the rule of stare decisis. Courts are refusing to be bound by those older decisions which are inconsistent with current norms of international human rights law.
In my view, this is an area of law where it is important to identify and consider the international legal norms affecting this issue while ensuring that the words of the Constitution are given their full force and meaning.
The respondents argued that the Constitutional principle of the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers placed sentencing policy under the purview of Parliament. Thus, Parliament and not the Courts have the power to provide for discretionary or mandatory sentences including the mandatory sentence for murder, unless the Court is satisfied that the mandatory sentence of death either infringes the doctrine of the separation of powers set out in the Constitution or contravenes or is inconsistent with other express provisions of the Constitution. This submission was supported by judicial authority in the cases of Hinds v the Queen (1977) AC 195; Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor (1981) AC 648 and Gerea v The Director of Public Prosecutions (1986) LRC 3 all of which provide authority for the proposition that it is not inconsistent with the independence of the judiciary to have a fixed mandatory sentence imposed by Parliament. I agree with this proposition. The court does apply and enforce mandatory sentences in accordance with legislation to that effect.
The point of difference in this case, however, is not the legality of mandatory sentences, for which there...
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