James Baptiste Appellant v The Queen Respondent [ECSC]

JurisdictionSt Lucia
JudgeBYRON, J.A.,SIR VINCENT FLOISSAC,SATROHAN SINGH
Judgment Date12 February 1996
Judgment citation (vLex)[1996] ECSC J0212-1
CourtCourt of Appeal (Saint Lucia)
Docket NumberCriminal Appeal No.19 of 1994
Date12 February 1996
[1996] ECSC J0212-1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

Before:

The Rt. Hon. Sir Vincent Floissac

The Hon. Mr. Justice C.m. Dennis Byron

The Hon. Mr. Justice Satrohan Singh

Criminal Appeal No.19 of 1994

Between:
James Baptiste
Appellant
and
The Queen
Respondent
Appearances:

Mr. Marcus Foster for the Appellant

Mr. Errol Walker, D.P.P. for the

BYRON, J.A.
1

On 10 th November 1994 the appellant was convicted of Murder after trial by jury presided over by d'Auvergne J. The deceased, David JnBaptiste, was his cousin and they had been on good terms. On the afternoon on the 15 th day of May 1993 they had been gambling outside Darcy's rum shop at Barre Denis in the quarter of Castries. Towards the end of the afternoon the deceased was heard to ask the appellant to pay him the money he owed and the appellant to say that he had already paid, whereupon the deceased grabbed the appellant by his collar and both men held on to fight. The deceased broke a bottle and held the broken glass in his hand and the appellant had an ice pick in his hand and they were trying to stick each other and arguing.

2

There were several people around and they intervened and prevented the fighting. The appellant put the ice pick in his pocket and the deceased threw the piece of bottle by the gutter. The appellant a man of about 46 years of age was seen to go by Mr. Darcy's van in front of the shop and cry before leaving the scene. The deceased, a much younger man in his early twenties, left and returned in a clean shirt and was sitting on a stool outside the shop when the appellant returned.

3

The time that had elapsed was an issue in the case and there was some variance in the estimates given by the prosecution witnesses. Andrew JnBaptiste testified that the altercation occurred about 5.30 pm and that the deceased returned after about 20 minutes and the appellant about half an hour later. Curtis Hippolyte said the altercation occurred about 6.00 pm the deceased returned after about 45 minutes and the appellant about 10 minutes after. Charles Augustin said it occurred about 4.45 pm the deceased returned about 2 hours later and about 4 hours later he saw the appellant going up the road. Joseph Caul who was in Mr. Darcy's Dance Hall said he saw the deceased in his wounded state after about 5.00 pm. P.C. Chicot testified that at 6.00 pm the appellant was already at Central Police Station making a statement. It would seem that the jury could have reasonably considered that the elapsed time did not exceed 30—45 minutes.

4

When he returned the appellant was bare backed and holding his hand behind his back. He went to the deceased who was sitting and said to him something like "look me, do what you doing now". He then hit him with the cutlass across his belly then again on his arm. The witnesses saw blood come from the arm and as the deceased started to get up the appellant struck him again by his neck and blood spurted. The deceased walked away fell to the ground and died soon after.

5

It was argued on behalf of the appellant that he was trying to hit the deceased with the flat side of the cutlass, and not to cut him. The consultant pathologist Dr. Stephen King testified that there was a minor incision on the back of the left upper arm which could have been a glancing blow and a cut to the neck severing the jugular vein and cutting the trachea or airway just below the thyroid cartilage. This wound caused the death. In his opinion these wounds could have been caused by a cutlass used with moderate force as no bones were cut, only soft tissue. There was no injury to the belly.

6

The appellant went to the police station and made a statement to the effect that he had come to report himself because the deceased attacked him with a cutlass and when he tried to disarm him the cutlass accidentally cut him.

7

The appellant made a brief statement from the dock. He said that he did not intend to kill the deceased and lashed him with the cutlass to scare him and that he lied in the statement he made to the police because he was ashamed that he had killed his best friend. He added that he and the deceased were playing cards and drinking rum since 2.00 pm and "it is the rum that caused that". He called one witness Cletus Andrew who said that he saw them playing cards and drinking together since 3.00 pm and when he saw them they were laughing.

8

The evidence therefore revealed that the possible defenses to the crime of murder of self-defence and accident which were raised in the appellant's voluntary statement to the police were subject to compelling rebuttals including the appellant's own admission that he had lied in raising them. Consequently self-defence was withdrawn from the jury and no criticisms have been levied on that ground.

9

The defenses specifically raised by the appellant in his statement in court were his lack of intention to kill and his intoxication. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, however, made it necessary for the learned trial Judge to direct the jury on the issue of provocation although the appellant had not said in terms that he was provoked, in accordance with the settled practice, described by Lord Tucker in Bullard v R [1961] 3.AII E.R. 470:

"It has been long settled law that if on the evidence, whether of the prosecution or of the defense, there is any evidence of provocation fit to be left to the jury, whether or not this issue has been specifically raised at the trial by counsel for the defence and whether or not the accused has said in terms that he was provoked, it is the duty of the judge, after a proper direction, to leave it open to the jury to return a verdict of manslaughter if they are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was unprovoked."

10

The grounds of appeal raised questions on the learned trial Judge's failure to give any direction on the effect of the appellant's admission that he had lied to the police, and on alleged errors of law in her directions on intoxication and provocation.

LIES
11

The proposition that it is very important for a jury to be carefully directed on the effect of a conclusion that an accused person is lying, was examined in two recent decisions of this court in Solomon v R. St.Lucia Grim. App. No.5 of 1994 and Williams v R. St.Vincent and the Grenadines Crim. App. No.10 of 1995. Briefly stated the principle is that whenever the jury are invited to regard, or there is danger that they may regard, lies told by the accused person, or evasive or discreditable conduct by him as probative of his guilt of the offense for which he has been charged a trial Judge is required to warn the jury against the natural tendency to think that if he is lying he must be guilty. See R v Richens [1993] 4 All E.R. at 877.

12

In R v Goodway [1993] 4 All E.R. 894 at p.900 Lord Taylor C.J. explained that in order to assist the jury to consider the factors relevant to a proper assessment of the value of such lies as tending to show guilt:

"the direction should be along the lines indicated in R v Lucas [1981] 2 All E.R. 1008. That is to the effect that the lie must be deliberate and must relate to a material issue. The jury must be satisfied that there is no innocent motive for the lie and should be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame, or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour…"

13

In my view a warning was required in this case. The appellant admitted that he inflicted the fatal injury unlawfully but raised issues about his mental state. Did he intend to kill? Did he lose his self-control as a result of extreme provocation? If the jury resolved those questions in his favour he would have been entitled to a manslaughter verdict and not one of murder. In raising those issues he admitted that his initial explanation to the police, alleging that the deceased had attacked him with the cutlass was a lie.

14

In such a circumstance the learned trial Judge had to ensure that the jury did not fall prey to the natural tendency to think that because he had lied he must be guilty of murder. He was entitled to have the learned trial Judge explain to the jury that they should look at the evidence and determine whether there was any motive for the lie other than his guilt. He gave such a motive when he said he responded to a feeling of shame, for killing his best friend a member of his family. The learned trial Judge should have pointed out to the jury that in assessing this evidence they could have considered whether his immediate and voluntary attendance at the police station lent support to his explanation for telling the untruth at that time.

INTOXICATION
15

Counsel complained that the trial Judge wrongly withdrew the issue of the appellant's drinking from the jury when she said:

"there was a lot of talk about rum. Accused said that it was the rum that caused him to act as he did. However, intoxication is no defense to any criminal chargeMembers of the jury, none of the evidence given in court has indicated that James and David were drinking. The accused however has told you he was drinking with David. You must consider this piece of evidence along with all the other evidence."

16

The unqualified declaration that intoxication is no defense to any criminal charge is inaccurate as it collides with the specific statutory provisions in Section 22 of the Criminal Code which makes it a defence in the special circumstances prescribed.

17

Intoxication induced without the consent of the person accused by the malicious or negligent act of another person as a result of which at the time of the act he did not know what he was doing or that it was wrong is a complete defense to any criminal charge resulting in acquittal. Insanity caused by intoxication even if it is only temporary is just as much a defense as insanity caused by other causes. The evidence in the case did not...

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1 cases
  • Cardinal Williams Appellant v The Queen Respondent [ECSC]
    • St Vincent
    • Court of Appeal (Saint Vincent)
    • 2 April 2001
    ... ... See St. Lucia cases Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1995 Denis Alphonse vs The Queen and Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1994 James Jn. Baptiste vs The Queen ... However, in this case, both doctors agreed that at the time of the killing the Appellant suffered from depressive illness ... ...

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