Jagroop v Johnny

• Jurisdiction: St Lucia
• Judge: Ellis JA
• Judgment Date: 15 October 2025
• Judgment citation (vLex): [2025] ECSC J1015-1
• Docket Number: SLUHCVAP2023/0023
• Court: Court of Appeal (Saint Lucia)

Between:

Shaheel Jagroop by his next friend Fabian Jagroop

Appellant

and

Lucretia Johnny Administratrix of the estate of Gregory Johnny and Velina Johnny

Respondent

[2025] ECSC J1015-1

Before:

The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis Justice of Appeal

The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward Justice of Appeal

The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry Justice of Appeal

SLUHCVAP2023/0023

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

Civil appeal — Administration of estates — Appeal against findings of fact — Concurrent findings of fact — Res judicata — Setting aside of order of judge of concurrent jurisdiction — Discretion to award costs — Costs in estate proceedings — Appeal against costs order

The litigation background to this appeal involves no less than three different but related legal proceedings which have resulted in judgments which are critical to the outcome of the appeal. The first is the judgment in Claim No. SLUHCV2010/0066 (the “First Claim”) brought by the appellant against the respondent in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of Mr Gregory Johnny. By that claim, the appellant sought a declaration that the grant of administration dated 16 ^th August 2009 is null and void, that the grant of administration be improbated or alternatively, that the grant of administration be rectified so that the appellant is reflected therein as having a 1/5 share in the estate of Gregory and Velina Johnny. In her judgment dated 26 ^th February 2014, Wilkinson J declared the appellant an heir by representation and a beneficiary in equal degree with the siblings of Mrs Greta Johnny-Jagroop of the estate of Gregory and Velina Johnny and ordered an amendment of the grant in such terms. Wilkinson J also declared that Royal Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (“RBTT”) life insurance proceeds received by Mr Gregory Johnny formed part of his estate for distribution in equal shares to his heirs. Wilkinson J also awarded prescribed costs to the appellant to be paid by the estate of Mr Gregory Johnny.

On 16 ^th April 2014, the appellant filed another Claim No. SLUHCV2014/0256 (the “Second Claim”) in which he sought a full accounting of all the assets and liabilities of the estates of Gregory and Velina Johnny. In her oral decision delivered on 8 ^th August 2019, Wilkinson J ordered, inter alia, that the respondent file the necessary documents to amend the letters of administration so as to reflect the appellant as a beneficiary under the estates of Gregory and Velina Johnny, and that the respondent prepare separate accounts of assets and liabilities for the estates of Gregory and Velina Johnny within 30 days. The costs of the suit were to be borne by the estates of Gregory and Velina Johnny and were to be fixed after the account of the estate of Mrs Velina Johnny was settled by the court.

The appellant (by his next friend) then commenced further proceedings (the “Third Claim”), seeking orders for full accounting of the estates of Gregory and Velina Johnny, for all sums found due and owing to him from the estate as a result of such accounting, and costs.

These latter proceedings came on for hearing before Innocent J (or the “learned judge”) who, on 21 ^st August 2023, ordered that there were no further assets forming part of the estate of Gregory and Velina Johnny available for distribution to the appellant, that costs in the First Claim shall be prescribed costs in the sum of $7,500.00 payable out of the estate of Mr Gregory Johnny, and that costs in the Third Claim be prescribed costs calculated at $24,623.95 in accordance with the amount paid out to the appellant. The learned judge also ruled that the appellant shall only recover 50% of the costs to which he would have been entitled.

Dissatisfied with the learned judge's decision, the appellant filed his notice of appeal on 8 ^th September 2023 in which he advanced the grounds of appeal outlined at paragraph 9 of this judgment.

Held: allowing the appeal in part, setting aside the order of the learned judge that the costs payable to the appellant in Claim No. SLUHCV2010/0066 (the First Claim) be prescribed costs in the sum of $7,500.00 and shall be payable out of the estate of Mr Gregory Johnny, dismissing the other grounds of appeal and affirming the other orders of the learned judge, and awarding the respondent 90% of her costs in the appeal to be paid by the appellant to be assessed if not agreed within 21 days of the date of this order, that:

• 1. An appellate court will only interfere with a finding of fact made by a trial judge if it is satisfied that the conclusion is plainly wrong. It must either be possible to identify a material error in the judge's process of reasoning such as a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis on the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. If the question is simply one of judgment as to the appropriate weight to be given to the relevant evidence, the appellate court must be satisfied that the judge's conclusion cannot reasonably be explained or justified.

  Group Seven Limited v Notable Services LLP[2019] EWCA Civ 614 applied; DB v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern Ireland[2017] UKSC 7 applied; Yates Associates Construction Company Ltd v Blue Sand Investments Ltd. BVIHCVAP2012/0028 (delivered 20th April 2016, unreported) applied; Flat Point Development Limited v Mary Dooley ANUHCVAP2015/0029 (delivered 13th March 2019, unreported) applied.

• 2. In this case, the appellant took no issue with the amount which the respondent claimed to have received by way of insurance proceeds but rather contends that he did not receive the full entitlement (1/5) share of those proceeds. The respondent's statement of account however asserts that these proceeds were distributed to the heirs (i.e., 1/5 shares after the expenses of the estate of Gregory Johnny were deducted). Apart from his bare assertion that the distribution of the assets of the estates is incomplete, the appellant advanced no cogent basis upon which the learned judge could deliberate. The appellant did not identify any material error in the judge's process of reasoning, and it cannot be said that the learned judge made a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or that he demonstrably misunderstood relevant evidence, or failed to consider relevant evidence.

• 3. The learned judge's findings in respect of the purported failure to account for funds contained in a BOSL Account No. 421819347; Bank of Nova Scotia Account No.10296, and RBTT Account No. 1107600117 cannot be impugned. The learned judge was seised of the relevant factual background and chronology, and it would not have been lost upon him that at the time of Velina Johnny's death in January 2007, Greta Johnny-Jagroop, the other account holder of the BOSL account, would have been alive and responsible for the closing of the account; and thus not forming part of the estate of Velina Johnny. The appellant did not argue below that the respondent failed to verify the authenticity of the document from RBTT Bank which indicated a savings Account No. 1107600117 with a balance of $10,712.01, nor did the appellant argue the issue of a delay on the part of the respondent in requesting information from RBTT in respect to this purported account. In any event, the relevant document was relied on by the appellant in his statement of account and the onus was therefore on him to verify its authenticity. It is therefore not open to him to raise these points on appeal. More conclusively, 1st National Bank (formerly RBTT Bank) by letter dated 21 ^st June 2021 informed that there were no accounts in the name of Gregory Johnny and Velina Johnny and no sums due and owing to the bank in respect of mortgages and other facilities. The learned judge categorically determined that the proceeds of Bank of Nova Scotia Account No. 10296 had already been distributed and the claimant\appellant had received his share of the proceeds. The appellant has failed to identify any errors in the learned judge's reasoning or conclusion. Therefore, there is no basis to interfere with the learned judge's findings of fact in respect of these accounts.

• 4. As a matter of settled practice, an appellate court will also decline to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, save in very limited circumstances. The question of the weight of the evidence is not a sufficient reason to depart from this established practice. No serious violation of legal principle or procedure has been identified as it relates to the liabilities and expenses of the estates in this case. Further, it has not been proved that the learned judge deviated from definitive findings made by Wilkinson J. It is clear that Wilkinson J did not consider her judgment and order to be a final one and made clear that she was unable to close off the accounts by way of the final order and gave a number of further directions for further accounting. To the extent that there were further legal costs associated with this Second Claim which arose, it would therefore fall to the judicial officer considering the final account to make any determination. It therefore follows that it was open to Innocent J to consider and determine the same.

  Collins Richardson et al v Benjamin W Richardson et al AXAHCVAP2016/0002 (delivered 24th May 2014, unreported) applied.

• 5. The doctrine of res judicata prescribes that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. The court, however, has the discretionary power to revoke or vary any order that it has power to make in appropriate circumstances. Having reviewed the relevant authorities and the...