Hatcher v Crichlow
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | Lewis, C.J.,Bishop, J. |
| Judgment Date | 05 December 1969 |
| Neutral Citation | LC 1969 HC 31 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Lucia) |
| Date | 05 December 1969 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1969 |
West Indies Associated States Supreme Court. (High Court)
Lewis, C.J. and Bishop, J.
Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1969
K.A.H. Foster for appellant.
L.A. Williams, Acting Attorney General, for respondent.
Immigration - Prohibited immigrant
Natural justice - Right to a hearing
The issue was whether the appellant could be lawfully deemed a prohibited immigrant by a magistrate
The question was whether punishment could be imposed under section 18 of the District Ordinance, Cap. 3 without giving the offending person an opportunity to be heard.
Held: Neither section 8 nor section 36 of the District Courts Ordinance, Cap. 3 conferred the power on a magistrate to deem any person a prohibited immigrant. The right to deem a person a prohibited immigrant was rested by the Ordinance in either the Governor in Council or an immigration officer.
No punishment could be imposed under the section without first giving the offending person an opportunity to show cause or to explain his conduct.
On 25 th November 1969, the court ordered that the removal order and the orders in respect of contempt of court made against the appellant on November 6 th 1969, be set aside, and we stated that we would give our reasons at a later date. This we now do.
Deborah Hatcher, the appellant, was arrested and charged for that she, on 2 nd November this year, at Vigie Airport having arrived in the State by air, disembarked without the consent of the Air Immigration Officer, contrary to section 36(1)(b) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 76 of the Revised Laws of St. Lucia.
On the 6 th November the appellant appeared before the magistrate in the First District Court, and pleaded guilty to the charge. She offered the explanation that she had filled out the papers but did not know that she had to check with the Immigration Officer. Then the learned magistrate, without entering a conviction, reprimanded and discharged her, and made a deportation order. His notes read as follows: “Defendant reprimanded and discharged. Defendant to be in custody until deported. Deportation order.” This order was followed by an outburst by the appellant accusing the magistrate of being part of a plot. This he deemed a gross contempt and imposed a fine of $40, in default, 2 months imprisonment.
On the same day the magistrate signed an order for the removal of the appellant, described as a prohibited immigrant, from the State.
This appeal is against the order made in respect of contempt of court, and against the removal order.
The notice of appeal filed on 6 th November sets out the following reasons:
- That the learned magistrate erred by failing to put the appellant on oath to show cause why she was not in contempt of court. 2. That the decision of the learned magistrate for a removal order is erroneous in law.
On the 11 th November the magistrate filed his reasons for making the removal order. He stated:
“By section 8(4) of the said Ordinance a person who arriving in the State disembarks without the consent of an Immigration Officer may be deemed a prohibited immigrant. As the defendant was not a citizen of this State, I exercised my discretion to the effect that she was a prohibited immigrant. By section 15 of the said Ordinance no person being deemed a prohibited immigrant shall remain in the State.
On the basis of the foregoing and on an application by the complainant pursuant to section 29 (1) of the said Ordinance, I made an order for the removal of the defendant from the State, and in the meantime to be detained in custody.”
Learned counsel for the appellant dealt with his second reason for appeal first, and he submitted that the learned magistrate had no authority under section 36(1)(b) to make a removal order; consequently he acted outside of the power given him by that section and thereby erred in law.
In reply, the learned Attorney General contended that when sections 36(1)(b), 15 and 8(4) of the Immigration Ordinance are read and construed together then the learned magistrate was empowered to deem the appellant a prohibited immigrant and thereafter to invoke the authority given to him by section 29 of the same Ordinance to order her removal from the State.
A brief reference to these provisions will suffice. Section 8(2) prohibits...
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