Dwight John v Massy United Insurance Ltd
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | Sandcroft, M. |
| Judgment Date | 21 October 2020 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2020] ECSC J1021-1 |
| Docket Number | Claim Number: SLUHCV2019/0312 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Lucia) |
| Date | 21 October 2020 |
EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(CIVIL)
Claim Number: SLUHCV2019/0312
Mrs. Cynthia Hinkson-Ouhla of Counsel for the Claimant
Mr. Sahleem Charles of Counsel for the Defendant
Sandcroft, M. [ Ag.]: This is an application by the defendant for summary judgment against the claimant. The defendant believes that the claimant's Statement of Case is anaemic. He has sought to have the defence struck out on the grounds that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and that the claimant has no reasonable prospects of succeeding on the claim in these proceedings.
The facts are basically not in dispute. The main issue is that the claimant applied for comprehensive insurance in response to which he was provided with car insurance and third-party insurance. The proposal form contained four options (i) comprehensive (ii) Third party, fire, and theft (iii) third party (iv) Act. The Claimant ticked the box which stated comprehensive. The Confirmation of motor insurance form describes the type of cover as comprehensive. The policy issued by the Insurance Company provided insurance for damage to the Taxi and third-party liability. The claimant was involved in an accident on 4 th March 2017. The car was written – off and he received the sum of $57,802.61 as compensation for the loss of the car.
The claimant is a self-employed taxi driver. The defendant is an Insurance Company. Since 2009, the claimant had consistently requested comprehensive insurance on his proposal form submitted to the defendant. The defendant had provided the claimant with insurance indemnifying him for damages to the motor vehicle and compulsory third-party risks.
The claimant was injured in an accident on 4th March 2017; the defendant had however indemnified the claimant with regard to the loss of the motor vehicle. However, the defendant refused to indemnify the claimant for the losses incurred due to the personal injuries sustained on the basis that the insurance coverage provided made no such provision.
In acknowledgement of the payment the Claimant signed a receipt which states:
Received from MASSEY UNITED INSURANCE LIMITED
The sum of Fifty-Seven Thousand Eight Hundred and Two Dollars (EC$57, 802.61) in full and final settlement discharge of a motor claim under Policy No CA01808310CC in respect of a total loss of my/our vehicle registration number TX 325 consequent upon an accident on or about 4 th March 2017.
The defendant relied on that receipt, which was prepared and drafted by them to say that the claimant by signing the said receipt has waived his right to claim damages for personal injuries. The claimant contended that no such right was waived since in stark contrast to the motor vehicle, no mention was made of personal injuries in the receipt.
The defendant also relied on an arbitration clause in the contract which stated that failure to refer to arbitration is fatal to the claim. The claimant contended that the court had authority to stay the proceedings.
The insurance contract had stated that ‘the insured, by a proposal and declaration which shall be the basis of this contract and is deemed to be incorporated herein, has applied to the Company for the insurance hereinafter contained and has paid or agreed to pay the premium as consideration’. There is no dispute that the claimant paid the premium as consideration for such insurance. The Confirmation of Motor Insurance Form described the type of cover as comprehensive.
By orders of May 25th, 2020, Master Sandcroft [Ag.] ordered that the parties file written submissions in relation to the interpretation of the insurance contract between the Claimant and the Defendant in the current proceedings.
The claimant had posited in his Statement of Claim (“SOC”) filed 25th June 2019 at paragraph 3 that he sought insurance coverage from the defendant in 2019 for the following coverage:
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i. Personal injuries to the claimant;
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ii. Injuries to passengers;
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iii. Motor vehicle coverage.
The claimant also posited that the policy specifically stated that the proposal form was the basis of the contract and was deemed to be incorporated as part of the contract.
The claimant further posited that the meaning to be ascribed to the word ‘comprehensive’ is its natural meaning. The courts had not pronounced any legal meaning to the word comprehensive which excluded indemnification for personal injuries.
The claimant also submitted that for an interpretation to be necessary the contract must contain an ambiguity. The contract stated that the proposal form was the basis of the contract and formed part of the contract. The ambiguity was created by the different meanings ascribed to the word comprehensive, which raised a question as to its proper meaning in the mind of a reasonable person. The description comprehensive did not provide business efficacy to the contract.
The claimant submitted that there was a difference between the Common law and Article 945. Article 945 required the interpreter to give the parties' common intention precedence over the wording of the contract. Under English Common Law, the interpretative starting point was the words of the contract which were used to ascertain the objective meaning of the words used in the context.
The claimant further submitted that the provisions dealing with interpretation of a contract are contained in Articles 945 to 953 of the Saint Lucia Civil Code (The Civil Code). The question before the court was whether there was any ambiguity in the contract. The ambiguity arose from the individual different meanings that each party had ascribed to the word comprehensive. The claimant is relying on the ordinary meaning of the word, whereas the defendant is relying on the technical restrictive meaning of the word. This ambiguity must be resolved by the applicable rules of statutory interpretation.
Article 945 of the Civil Code states:
‘When the meaning of any part of a contract is doubtful, its interpretation is to be sought from the common intention of the parties rather than from a literal construction of the words.”
The claimant posited that the aforesaid article differed from the English common law position but that whichever method of interpretation was used the outcome would be the same. At paragraph 41–058 of the Thirtieth Edition of Chitty on Contracts it is stated that:
‘Insurance contracts are subject to the same approach as to contractual construction as other contracts, namely that the words of the contract will be interpreted to divine their contextual meaning consistently with the sense and purpose of the policy, even if it is at odds with the literal meaning of the contract.’
The claimant further posited that should the use of the word comprehensive be restricted to the cover indemnification for damage to the motor vehicle and excludes the indemnification for compensation for personal injury losses without expressly stating that such liability was excluded. That the defendant was seeking to restrict the meaning of the word comprehensive to the technical meaning, without defining the meaning in the definition section of the aforesaid contract. The word comprehensive meant all-inclusive, and that the inability to agree on the meaning of the word comprehensive meant that there was no common intention of the parties. This situation has caused some doubt as to the meaning of comprehensive according to the contract. The contract is a standard form contract prepared by the defendant. Article 951 states:
“In cases of doubt the contract is interpreted against him who has stipulated and in favour of him who has contracted the obligation.”
Article 947 states:
Expression susceptible of two meanings must be taken in the sense which agrees best with the context.
The claimant had posited too that the ordinary meaning of comprehensive agreed best with the context and it was the proposal form that required comprehensive insurance for a taxi-driver who was self-employed.
The claimant also posited that in regard to the English position, there is no judicially accepted meaning of the word comprehensive and therefore the restrictive technical meaning which the Defendant is seeking to ascribe to the word ought to be rejected in favour of the ordinary meaning being put forward by the Claimant. Under English law it is also the rule that in cases of doubt the contract will be interpreted contra proferentem.
The claimant posited in conclusion that the defendant had failed to justify its application of its restrictive meaning of the word comprehensive. Consequently, the ordinary commercial meaning of the word ought to prevail. That the contractual provisions as they were do not provide comprehensive insurance to the claimant which was what he specifically requested on his proposal form. Therefore, the defendant was in breach of its obligation to the claimant, whether one applied the English law or the provisions of the Saint Lucia Civil Code.
The claimant had further submitted that Article 917A of the Saint Lucia Civil Code was the statutory provision which determined the source of authorities pertinent to interpretation of contracts in St. Lucia. That the general law is that the law of contract ought to be construed resorting to the English Common law except when the express words of the Civil Code created a conflict with the common law. Put another way, reliance on the English Common law is permissible when the authorities are in accordance with the expressed provisions of the Articles of the Civil Code.
The claimant also submitted that in determining whether there was a conflict or which law was applicable, the party...
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