Crick v Peter & Company Ltd

JurisdictionSt Lucia
JudgeBishop, J.
Judgment Date02 July 1968
Neutral CitationLC 1968 HC 14
Docket NumberNo. 116 of 1968
CourtHigh Court (Saint Lucia)
Date02 July 1968

West Indies Associated States Supreme Court. (High Court)

Bishop, J.

No. 116 of 1968

Crick
and
Peter & Company Ltd.
Appearances:

H. Giraudy for the plaintiff.

A. McNamara for the defendant.

Contract - Breach

Facts: The plaintiff mechanic sought damages for an alleged breach of contract and claimed money due under the same contract from the defendant company. The plaintiff was a sub-lessee in actual possession under a five year contract in writing due to expire in February 1970. The contract contained a clause granting the plaintiff an option to have the contract renewed at the expiration of the present time. The question was whether the notice of termination given was reasonable

Held: One month's notice would be reasonable notice of termination of the agreement. The one day's notice given to the plaintiff was inadequate. Judgment given for the plaintiff in the sum of $620.00 special damages and $200.00 general damages.

Bishop, J.
1

Hugh Crick, a motor mechanic and the plaintiff in this action, has claimed damages for an alleged breach of contract, and has claimed money due under the same contract from Peter & Co. Ltd. a company incorporated under the law of St. Lucia and having its registered office in Castries and hereafter referred to as the defendant.

2

The first three paragraphs of the plaintiff's declaration have, been admitted by the defendant and I think it will be sufficient if I just quote what has been admitted.

3

Paragraph (1) “The defendant is and was at all times material hereto, agent in the Island of Saint Lucia for Bedford and Vauxhall Motors and Shell Antilles (Trinidad) Limited.

4

(2) The plaintiff is the sub-lessee in actual possession under a five year contract in writing due to expire in February 1970 of the aforementioned Shell Antilles (Trinidad) Limited in respect of the premises and installations in the town of Castries in the said Island known as “Shell Service Station”.

5

(3) The aforementioned contract contains a clause granting to the plaintiff an option to have the said contract renewed at the expiration of the present term.”

6

It was also alleged by the plaintiff and admitted by the defendant that it was the practice of the defendant to employ the plaintiff to service all vehicles imported into this island by the defendant from Bedford and Vauxhall Motors and to repair all the vehicles belonging to the defendant.

7

In addition the plaintiff alleges that there was an oral agreement made in February 1960 between himself and the defendant company whereby the latter employed him to carry out the servicing and the repairs already mentioned; which servicing and repairs he carried out without any complaint from the defendant.

8

Other terms of the alleged oral agreement were set out in the plaintiff's declaration as follows:

“It was a term of the said agreement that the plaintiff, should for the purpose of servicing the same take delivery upon their arrival upon the wharf at Castries aforesaid of all motor vehicles consigned to the defendant.

It was a further term that the defendant pay the plaintiff for the aforementioned servicing at the following rates:

  • (a) $30.00 per Viva Vauxhall motorcar

  • (b) $50.00 per each other vehicle

  • (c) $10. 00 per 7-plate 12-volt battery

  • (d) $12. 00 per 11-plate 12-volt battery

  • (e) $15. 00 per 21-plate 6-volt battery.

It was a further term of the said agreement that the plaintiff should supply petrol and oil to each vehicle to the limits hereunder stated, and the defendant should pay the plaintiff therefor, at the following rates:

  • (a) 5 gallons premium petrol at 91c, per gallon, to each motorcar;

  • (b) 8 gallons ordinary petrol, at 77c. per gallon, to each motor gasoline truck;

  • (c) 8 gallons diesel fuel, at 52 1/2 c. per gallon, to each diesel motor truck;

  • (d) 6 pints oil, at 53c. per pint, to each Viva Vauxhall motorcar;

  • (e) 8 pints oil, at 53c. per pint, to each Victor motorcar;

  • (f) 10 pints oil, at 53c. per pint, to each other motorcar;

  • (g) 12 pints oil, at 40c. per pint, to each 3-ton motor gasoline truck;

  • (h) 20 pints oil, at 40c. per pint, to each other motor truck.”

9

The plaintiff alleged, in the declaration, that sixteen motor vehicles were consigned to the defendant and landed in this island between the 1 st February 1967 and the 7 th March 1967; that he-took delivery of these vehicles, and that he serviced fully and delivered nine of them. The defendant has failed to pay him the amount of Four hundred and seventeen dollars and seventeen cents due to him for this work.

10

The defendant admitted in defence “that the; outstanding amount of Four hundred and seventeen dollars and seventeen cents is due by the defendant to the plaintiff… and the defendant is ready and willing to pay the same to the plaintiff”. There is, therefore no dispute that judgment may be entered for the plaintiff in the amount of Four hundred and seventeen dollars and seventeen cents.

11

In his declaration, the plaintiff then dealt specifically with the events of the 7 th March 1967. He alleged that the defendant terminated the oral agreement without just cause and that in pursuance of such termination, the defendant by his servants wrongfully dispossessed the plaintiff of the remaining seven vehicles which he had partly serviced. It is the contention of the plaintiff that as a result of the defendant's action he has suffered special damage – which he has itemized – and general damage.

12

In defence the defendant denied the existence of any oral agreement as alleged by the plaintiff and asserted that “on or about 7 th March 1967, the defendant ceased to employ the plaintiff to service or repair its vehicles as it was dissatisfied with the work performed by the plaintiff in this regard”.

13

No particulars of the nature of the work with which the defendant was dissatisfied or of the nature or extent of the dissatisfaction were given nor demanded but some evidence was led in support of the assertion.

14

The defendant admitted removing the seven vehicles “from the plaintiff's possession” and reiterated as the reason its dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's work on the defendant vehicles.

15

The defendant denied wrongful dispossession of the vehicles and also denied that the seven vehicles had been partly serviced.

16

Counsel...

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