Compton v Crusader Caribbean Publishing Company (1971) Ltd et Al
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | Bruno J |
| Judgment Date | 26 July 1977 |
| Neutral Citation | LC 1977 HC 9 |
| Docket Number | No. 94/1975 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Lucia) |
| Date | 26 July 1977 |
High Court of Justice
Bruno, J.
No. 94/1975
E.H. Giraudy, Esq., for the plaintiff.
Defendant No. 2 in person.
Damages - Libel — Newspaper article — Statements referring to Prime Minister of St. Lucia — Newspaper enjoying wide circulation — Damages of $60,000 awarded plaintiff.
The plaintiff in this action is the Honourable John Compton who, at the relevant time, was Premier of the State of St. Lucia. Indeed he still is.
The first-named defendant was at the material times proprietor, publisher and printer of the “Crusader”, a newspaper with an admittedly wide circulation not only in St. Lucia but overseas.
It is admitted that the second-named defendant was at all material times editor of the said newspaper, the “Crusader”.
Subjects of this action are two articles published in the “Crusader” on the 22nd March, 19?5, and the 29th March, 19?5, respectively.
The article of the said 22nd March, 1975, appeared with banner headline on the front page of the newspaper. It is captioned “ Move to Arrest Compton”.
As if to ensure that there would be no misapprehension by anyone who read it as to whom the article referred there appeared on the said front page a photograph of the plaintiff, with the words “Premier John Compton” in bold type beneath it.
And, in addition to the headline, these are the words of which the plaintiff complains:
(a) “Since “Hon. John Compton at the time of the sale “was Premier of St. Lucia and article 1394 of the Civil Code of St. Lucia prohibits public officers from becoming buyers of public property entrusted to them, there is a move to issue a warrant for the arrest of Premier John. Compton”.
(b) “Premier Compton as head of the Cabinet was directly involved in the decision to sell himself three acres of Crown Lands for nine hundred and fifty-four dollars ($954) and certain members of the Opposition have initiated action to charge Hon. Compton for the flagrant violation of the Criminal Code of St. Lucia”.
(c) “A long-time observer of the St. Lucian political scene told the Crusader: ‘I can remember clearly in 1971 when the Government of Premier Compton was accused of corruption on public platforms, the Premier told the Press to show him the corrupt minister and he will dismiss that minister within the hour. Well now is the time for the Premier to back his words with action’. “
With an equally arresting headline an the front page: “ Compton's Crown Grant — what the Law says” the March 29, 1975, issue of the “Crusader” published the following words of which, together with the said headline, the plaintiff also complains:
(a) “And if the Premier breaks the law and buys Crown Lands in his own name, to what penalty does he open himself.
“Article 582 of the Criminal Code States:
‘Whoever, being a public officer, in the discharge of the duties of his office, commits any fraud or breach of trust affecting the public, whether such fraud or breach of trust would have been criminal or not if committed against private person is liable indictably to imprisonment for five years, or summarily for imprisonment for six months’.
(b) “And if the breach of trust is fraudulent, Article 340 (1) (amended) says:
‘Whoever commits a fraudulent breach of trust is liable indictably to imprisonment for five years, or if the property does not exceed forty-eight dollars in value, summarily to imprisonment for twelve months.’”
Again the photograph of the plaintiff appears on the said front page with the name “John Compton” beneath it.
And the plaintiff contends that by reason of these publications he has been seriously injured and disparaged in his character, credit and reputation and in the way of his office as Premier of the State and of his profession. Further he alleges that he has been brought into public scandal, odium, contempt, ridicule and ostracism and has suffered damage.
The action was filed on the 18th April, 1975. The defence of both defendants was filed on the 5th June, 1975.
In paragraph 2 of their defence the defendants admitted responsibility for both publications.
An application by Summons for Directions was filed by the plaintiff's solicitor on the 5th December, 1975. That Summons sought orders by a judge in Chambers with respect to two separate and distinct matters.
In part (a) the plaintiff required certain particulars of the defendants. While an order for striking out certain paragraphs in the defendants' pleadings was the purpose of part (b).
The Summons came up for hearing before Renwick, J on the 15th January, 19'76. The learned judge acceded to an application by the plaintiff for the delivery by the defendants of certain particulars with respect to paragraphs 5, 8 and 12 of the defendants' pleadings.
I reproduce these paragraphs:
(5) “In so far as the said words in paragraph 5(a) and 5(b) consist of statements of fact the said words are true in substance and in fact; in so far as the said words consist of expressions of opinion, they are fair comment made upon the said facts which are a matter of public interest”.
(8) “In so far as the said words in paragraph 5(c) consist of statements of fact the said words are true in substance and in fact; in so far as the said words consist of expressions of opinion, they are fair comment made upon the said facts which are a matter of public interest”.
(12) “In so far as the said words in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) of the Statement of Claim consist of statements of fact the said words are true in substance and in fact; in so far as the said words consist of expressions of opinion they are fair comment made upon the said facts which are a matter of public interest”.
The condition imposed for failure by the defendants to comply with the learned judge's order within the specified time was that the allegation of which particulars were ordered would be struck out. The defendants have defaulted. I pause merely to observe what is obvious. They are now precluded from giving evidence in support of such allegations.
Part (b) of the Summons was heard by me and, on the 15th July, 197, I ordered the following paragraphs of the defence be struck out for being in-admissible:
(i) 4 (10) and 4 (13)
(ii) 7 (10) and 7 (13)
(iii) 11 (10) and 11(13)
Sub-paragraphs 4(10), 7(10) and 11(10) are identical. The same applies to sub-paragraphs 4(13), 7(13) and 11(13).
Consequently it would suffice to reproduce subparagraphs 4(10) and 4(13). They follow 4(10);
“Prior to the said sale to the plaintiff the Cabinet of Saint Lucia had decided that the La Tigre Estate should be sub-divided and sold to persons in possession on condition that (1) account should be taken of the extent of cultivation of the squatters (2) not less than 5 acres and not more than 10 acres should be sold (3) ownership of other lands should be taken into consideration and (4) the selling price should be $300 per acre plus the cost of surveys.
“The defendant will contend that the said decision was in force at all material times and that all material times on and after the date of the said decision the plaintiff was a member of the said Cabinet and/or the Minister of the Crown responsible for Crown Lands and/or agreed to and/or knew of the said decision by which he was bound.
4(13) “The defendant will also contend that in relation to the said sale:–
(a) the matters set out in 7(a) and 7(b) were not complied with and that the defendant /knew or ought to have known that they were not complied with;
(b) the land sold to the plaintiff was within 33 feet of the top of a bank of the Palmiste Ravine and that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that the said sale contravened the provision of the Crown Lands Regulations in that respect;
(c) that the land was less than 5 acres and that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that the said sale contravened the provision of the said Regulations and/or the aforesaid decision of the Cabinet;
(d) the said sale was made in contravention of one or more or all of the provisions of the decision of the Cabinet referred to in paragraph 14 above and that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of such contravention before the date of the sale to him by the said Crown Grant”.
Approximately one month after I had made the Order the second-named defendant filed Notice of an application, the purpose or which was that at the hearing of the action an application would be made by him to the court for determination of the matter by another judge. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn to by the said second-named defendant.
It is not without significance that Mr. Evans Calderon, Solicitor for both defendants at the hearing in Chambers on the 8th day of July, 1976, made no such application. Neither did he swear to an affidavit in support of the second-named defendant's application.
Equally significant too is the fact that no such application has been made by the first-named defendant. Indeed it is of interest to note that it was with the consent of legal representatives on both sides — that the order of the 8th July, 1976, was made.
The Order read:
(1.) That counsel for the defendants reply to submission by counsel for the plaintiff at 9 a.m. on Monday, 12th July, 1976, in Chambers.
(2) That further proceedings be continued in open court immediately following ruling of the judge on the fore-mentioned submission.
When drawn up the Order was signed by both Mr. Giraudy for the plaintiff and Mr. Calderon, representing the defendants.
By the 15th July, 19'76, all interlocutory matters had been disposed of and the matter was deemed ripe for trial.
Indeed so cognizant was No. 2 defendant of that fact, that as long ago as the 13th August, 19'76, he...
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