Alcee v Bray
Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
Judge | Bishop, J. |
Judgment Date | 24 May 1967 |
Neutral Citation | LC 1965 HC 13 |
Docket Number | Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1967 |
Court | High Court (Saint Lucia) |
Date | 24 May 1967 |
Supreme Court of the Windward and Leeward Islands. (Appellate Jurisdiction).
Bishop and Glasgow, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1967
Desmond McNamara for the appellant
Henry Giraudy for the respondent
Tort - Trespass to land
Facts: The issue was whether the magistrate erred in law in holding that the first defendant, an employee of the St. Lucia Electricity Services Ltd. was a trespasser ab initio because the company had not in accordance with section 16(1) of the Electricity Supply Ordinance 1964 within three days of trespass by the first defendant on the lands of the plaintiff to remedy a dangerous situation notified the plaintiff of the trespass
Held: The statute permitted interference with the normal legal rights of a private party by giving the company power to enter upon private land for certain express purposes — Appeal dismissed.
This Court has been asked to consider one ground of appeal, namely “that the learned magistrate erred in point of law, in that he held that No. 1 defendant an employee of the St. Lucia Electricity Services Ltd. was a trespasser ab initio because the Company had not in accordance with s. 16 (1) of the Electricity Supply Ordinance No. 27 of 1964 within three days of trespass by the defendant No. 1 on lands of the plaintiff to remedy a dangerous situation, notified the, plaintiff of the trespass.
Unfortunately counsel for the: appellant did not support his interpretation of the relevant; sections of the Electricity Supply Ordinance 1964 with any authority; nor indeed did counsel for the respondent who merely differed on the interpretation of counsel for the appellant and contended that the magistrate had not erred in law.
Suction 16 of the Electricity Supply Ordinance 1964, in our view, permits interference; with the normal legal rights of a private party. It gives to the Company the power to enter upon private land for certain express purposes; in addition, it sets out a certain requirement that is, in effect, for the protection of the owner or occupier of the land; i.e. that the Company should normally give three days notice to the private individual unless the latter gives consent to dispense with such notification.
There is a proviso to s. 16 — and where there is a proviso of this nature the burden of proof is placed upon; the Company — in which there are two stipulations; in our view these stipulations serve to...
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