Alban Felicien v Christopher Hunte
| Jurisdiction | St Lucia |
| Judge | Sandcroft, M |
| Judgment Date | 06 April 2020 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2020] ECSC J0406-1 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Lucia) |
| Docket Number | Claim Number: SLUHCV2019/0171 |
| Date | 06 April 2020 |
EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(CIVIL)
Claim Number: SLUHCV2019/0171
Mrs. Carol Gedeon-Clovis of Counsel for the Claimant
Mr. Leevie Herelle of Counsel for the Defendant
Sandcroft, M [Ag.]: This is an application for ruling on a preliminary issue in defamation proceedings. The Claimant/Applicant is seeking an order to say that the words spoken by the 1 st Defendant, given their natural and ordinary and/or inferential meaning meant, and were understood to mean, that the Claimant was unjustly benefitting from funds of the Government of Saint Lucia; funds which were to be officially used for drainage cleaning.
Affidavit evidence and submissions were filed in support of and opposition to the application by the Claimant.
The Claimant stated that on Friday, 13 th day of April 2018 at approximately 12:30p.m. the first Defendant, whilst hosting the television programme “Politically Incorrect” which was aired on the Choice television channel, made defamatory statements with respect to the Claimant. The said statements (hereinafter referred to as “the Publication”) are shown in the following:
“Some pictures from Monier. This is in the constituency where Government is doing drainage works, so I'm hoping that you can recognize the area. Works are not being done along the road, right, but they're being done on a UWP supporter's private property. Every day Government vehicles SLG 1044 and a blue truck TK6636 drop off about 14 workers with supplies. There's an actual housing development on Jerome Adams' land and the Actie family land. This is a housing project by Jerome Actie and Alban also known as Spider's right hand, right, but it's being done under the guise of a drainage project in Monier. They have had excavators for this project which started in March 1 st of 2018. So my question is, if Government resources are being used to facilitate the private development in Monier with 14 workers to do a housing project by Jerome Actie and Alban, right hand man of Spider's, over using also, and I'm mentioning them, SLG1044 and a blue truck-SLG, Saint Lucia Government vehicle-and a blue truck TK 6636, in order to not do the drainage works that is officially announced and instead basically do preparatory works for private housing development. Hmmm. It's a simple question. Say I lie if I lie. I've given as much details as I can and I'm asking the question.”
The defendant's application is made pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules, 2002 (CPR) r. 69.4 which reads:
69.4 (1) At any time after the service of the particulars of claim, either party may apply to a judge sitting in private for an order determining whether or not the words complained of are capable of bearing a meaning or meanings attributed to them in the statements of case.
(2) If it appears to the judge on the hearing of an application under paragraph (1) that none of the words complained of are capable of bearing the meaning or meanings attributed to them in the statements of case, the judge may dismiss the claim or make such other order or give such judgment in the proceedings as may be just.
This provision is in the same terms as the U.K. Rules of the Supreme Court ( RSC) Ord. 82 r. 3A that had been the focus of attention in various reported English decisions. In Mapp v News Group Newspaper Ltd [1998] Q.B. 52, it was held that the purpose of the rule was to enable the court in appropriate cases to fix before trial the permissible meaning of the alleged defamatory words so as to ascertain the degree of injury to the claimant's reputation and to evaluate any defences raised. Hirst, L.J., noted that it is for the judge to rule, when asked to do so, whether the words are capable of bearing a particular meaning or meanings alleged in the statement of claim, that is, to lay down the limits of the range of possible defamatory meanings of which the words are capable and it is for the jury to determine the actual meaning of the words within that permissible range. In Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 Q.B. 157 at 174, Lord Diplock highlighted the rationale behind this division of function between judge and jury in these matters.
It is, by now, well settled that the test to be applied in determining the meaning of words in a libel action is what the words would convey to the ordinary man. Lord Reid in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd sub norm Rubber Improvements Limited v Daily Telegraph [1964] A.C. 234, 258 (HL) explained it clearly when he stated:
“There is no doubt that in actions for libel the question is what the words would convey to the ordinary man: it is not one of construction in the legal sense. The ordinary man does not live in an ivory tower and he is not inhibited by knowledge of the rules of construction. So he can and does read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience in worldly affairs. I leave aside questions of innuendo where the reader has some special knowledge which might lead him to attribute a meaning to the words not apparent to those who do not have the knowledge.”
In relation to the test to be applied when a judge is to determine whether or not words are capable of a particular meaning attributed to them by a claimant in an action for libel, Lord Reid further stated:
“…I think it sufficient to put the test in this way. Ordinary men and women have different temperaments and outlooks. Some are unusually suspicious and some are unusually naïve. One must try to envisage people between these two extremes and see what is the most damaging meaning they would put on the words in question.”
In Skuse v Granada Television Limited [1996] E.M.L.R 276, the English Court of Appeal was given what it viewed as “the unusual task”, to decide on the meaning to be actually attributed to alleged defamatory words contained in a television programme. In deciding on the approach to be adopted in undertaking that task, the court reviewed several authorities and affirmed and applied some useful principles. Although my task is not to determine whether the actual meaning of the words alleged by the claimant is defamatory but rather to determine whether the words are capable of bearing the meanings alleged, I nevertheless find the principles distilled in Skuse rather instructive and pertinent. The head notes, which I accept as being reflective of the court's reasoning, highlighted these major principles:
1. The court should give to the material complained of the natural and ordinary meaning which it would have conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching the television once [in 1985].
2. The hypothetical reasonable reader or viewer was not naïve but he was not unduly suspicious. He could read between the lines. He could read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and might indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking. But he was to be treated as being a man who was not avid for scandal and someone who did not select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings were available. ( Hart v Newspaper Publishing plc Unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 October 1989) applied.
3. While limiting its attention to what the defendant had actually said or written, the court should be cautious of an over-elaborate analysis of the material in issue. In deciding what impression the material would have been likely to have on the hypothetical reasonable viewer, the court was entitled (if not bound) to have regard to the impression made on it. Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 applied.
4. The court should not be too literal in its approach. The layman reads in an implication much more freely than a lawyer and was especially prone to do so when it was derogatory. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 applied.
5. A statement should be taken to be defamatory if it would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or would be likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people generally… Slim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 applied.
6. In determining the meaning of the material complained of, the court was not limited by the meanings which either the plaintiff or the defendant sought to place on the words. Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147 applied.
7. The defamatory meaning pleaded by the plaintiff was to be treated as the most injurious meaning the words were capable of conveying. The questions a judge sitting alone had to ask himself were (1) was the natural and ordinary meaning of the words that which was alleged in the statement of claim, (2) if not, what (if any) less injurious meaning did they bear? derogatory. Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd applied.
9. The court was not concerned at this stage with the merits or demerits of any possible defence to the plaintiff's claim.
The question that is reserved for my contemplation is strictly one of law and that is to say whether the words alleged by the claimant, in the statement of case, as being defamatory of them are capable of the meanings attributed to them by the claimant or are capable of any less defamatory meaning whether pleaded or not by either party. The critical question is really this: would an ordinary person viewing the televised programme complain of discover in it matters defamatory of the claimant? It is not the meaning that suspiciously-minded persons would put on the words that is pertinent but rather the most damaging meaning that the ordinary fair-minded person, who is not unusually suspicious or unusually naïve would put on them.
In Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1239, at 1251–1252, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in describing the role of the judge in these matters noted...
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